Africa Is Not One Legal Market

Why Local Legal Expertise Matters

Jacobs Potgieter Incorporated | Corporate & Commercial Practice - 21 April 2026

Key takeaway:

Africa comprises 54 separate legal markets. The four most costly errors at market entry (misreading the licence, underestimating the regulator, ignoring capital flow mechanics, and under-documenting governance) are not theoretical risks. They are documented, quantified losses incurred by some of the continent’s largest and most sophisticated investors.

For many investors, the commercial opportunity across African markets is compelling. Growth, infrastructure demand, expanding middle classes, and long-term strategic positioning make the continent difficult to ignore. But from a legal perspective, the most common and most costly mistake remains the same: treating Africa as though it were a single market operating under a broadly uniform legal framework.

It is not.

Africa comprises 54 countries, each with its own regulators, licensing regimes, ownership requirements, exchange control frameworks, competition authorities, and governance expectations. What works in one jurisdiction may be legally impermissible in another. What succeeds in one sector may be structurally impossible in the next. And what appears legally compliant at entry may, years later, expose an investor to demands (regulatory, fiscal, or political) that were never modelled.

This article does not argue against investing in Africa. It argues for investing in Africa correctly: with jurisdiction-specific legal architecture built from the ground up, and with an honest understanding of where the legal complexity actually sits.

Four themes consistently define the difference between investments that work and those that do not. Each is illustrated below by cases in which well-capitalised, experienced investors got the mechanics wrong and paid for it.

1. The Licence Is the Business

Not an Administrative Step That Follows It

In regulated sectors, the licence, permit, concession or regulatory approval is not a formality to be resolved after commercial terms are agreed. It is the investment. It determines what entity may operate, what conditions apply to that entity, what local participation is required, and — critically — at what cost and on what timeline the business may actually commence.

The sequencing error is common: investors agree commercial terms, establish a group structure, and then seek the regulatory approval. When the approval reshapes the structure, requires different entity types, or costs far more than projected, the restructuring that follows is expensive and the delay is often fatal to commercial momentum.

IN PRACTICE: SAFARICOM'S ENTRY INTO ETHIOPIA

When Safaricom (Africa’s most successful telecoms operator) entered Ethiopia in 2021, it paid USD 850 million for its telecommunications licence alone. That figure was not a tax, not a deposit, and not a refundable fee. It was the price of the right to operate. A separate regulatory process for M-Pesa, Safaricom’s mobile money service, then cost an additional USD 150 million and took long enough that Ethio Telecom’s competing Telebirr platform had accumulated millions of users before M-Pesa could legally operate. By the time M-Pesa launched, the incumbent had a structural head start that was directly traceable to the licencing sequence. Safaricom had invested over USD 2.2 billion in total before the business reached operational scale. The lesson is not that Safaricom was wrong to enter Ethiopia. It is that any investor who had not modelled the licence cost, the licence timeline, and the regulatory sequencing as foundational elements of the investment thesis would have found those numbers catastrophic. The licence was not a step toward the business. It was the business.

This is particularly acute in telecoms, financial services, energy, mining, and infrastructure. Sectors where the regulatory approval shapes not only market access but entity structure, ownership composition, and ongoing compliance obligations. Where a licence is required, the legal and regulatory mapping must come first. Structure follows approval, not the other way around.

2. Regulatory Involvement Does Not End at Approval

It Shapes the Ongoing Structure of the Business

A common underestimation is that regulatory engagement is an entry-stage event. In practice, the regulator is often a continuing structural participant in the investment. One whose requirements evolve, whose approvals carry conditions, and whose oversight extends to how the business operates, not merely whether it may operate.

This is most visible in competition-sensitive infrastructure transactions, where approval is granted conditionally, subject to behavioural obligations that materially affect the economics, governance, and competitive positioning of the combined entity. Investors who do not model the full scope of regulatory conditions, including those imposed after approval, frequently find that the business they end up with is structurally different from the one they planned.

IN PRACTICE: VODACOM AND MAZIV

In November 2021, Vodacom announced a transaction to acquire a 30% co-controlling stake in Maziv, the holding company for Vumatel and Dark Fibre Africa, two of South Africa’s largest fibre infrastructure providers. The deal, valued at approximately R13.2 billion, was straightforward in commercial logic: a mobile operator combining with fixed-line fibre infrastructure to create an integrated connectivity platform.  What followed was a four-year regulatory process involving three separate regulatory bodies, two blockings, and a reversal on appeal. The Competition Commission recommended prohibition. The Competition Tribunal blocked the deal in 2024. The Competition Appeal Court reversed that decision in August 2025. ICASA then provided separate communications sector approval in November 2025. The deal was finally implemented in December 2025, four years after announcement.  By that point, Vodacom’s approved structure bore conditions that the original transaction did not contemplate: open access obligations to competitor ISPs, free fibre connectivity to public institutions, time-bound investment commitments, and restrictions on Vodacom’s access to competitively sensitive information within Maziv. The regulator did not simply approve the transaction. It restructured it. Investors who had not anticipated the scope of regulatory reshaping and the four-year capital commitment that came with it, would have been operating against materially different assumptions from day one.

The practical implication is that regulatory engagement must be modelled not only as a condition precedent but as an ongoing governance variable. The approvals process does not produce a clean starting line. It produces a set of obligations that run with the business, and those obligations must be understood, documented, and built into the operational and commercial structure from the outset.

3. Capital Flow Mechanics Must Be Designed at Entry

Not Assumed

One of the most consistently underestimated legal questions in cross-border African investment is deceptively simple: how does money lawfully move into, through, and out of the investment? Shareholder funding, dividends, loan repayments, management fees, and exit proceeds all require legally compliant mechanisms. In many African jurisdictions, those mechanisms are regulated by exchange control frameworks, central bank approvals, foreign exchange availability, and documentation requirements that are not always transparent at the point of entry.

The error is not usually that investors ignore the question entirely. It is that they answer it at a principle level “dividends may be declared and repatriated” without designing and documenting the specific legal mechanics required to make that true in practice. The gap between the principle and the mechanics is where the exposure sits.

IN PRACTICE: MTN IN NIGERIA

MTN entered Nigeria in 2001 with an initial capital injection that included a mix of equity and shareholder loans. In 2006, MTN carried out an internal restructuring, converting those shareholder loans to preference shares. The process required Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) approval. The bank handling the transaction received an approval in principle but, according to the CBN’s subsequent findings, did not complete the documentation process to obtain final approval before dividends began to be repatriated against those instruments.  In August 2018, over a decade later, the CBN declared USD 8.13 billion in historical dividend payments illegal, issued sanctions against four banks, and demanded that MTN Nigeria reverse the transfers and return the funds to Nigeria. The demand represented approximately half of MTN Nigeria’s market capitalisation. The South African Reserve Bank formally warned that compelling reversal of that magnitude could create systemic risk in South Africa’s banking sector. The matter settled in December 2018 for approximately USD 53 million, but only after four months of regulatory and legal exposure that wiped approximately 20% from MTN’s share price.  The second dimension of the same problem emerged in 2020, when Nigeria’s foreign exchange scarcity meant that MTN simply could not access sufficient foreign currency to repatriate dividends at all, not because of any legal breach, but because the capital flow mechanism depended on forex availability that the Nigerian market could not provide. R4.2 billion remained trapped in Nigeria, forcing MTN Group to suspend its dividend policy entirely for the 2020 financial year.  These are two distinct failures: one structural and documentary, the other operational and macroeconomic. Neither was visible at the point of entry. Both were foreseeable with proper legal design.

The MTN case illustrates a principle that applies across African markets: it is not sufficient to establish that value may be extracted in principle. The specific instruments, approval requirements, documentation standards, and forex mechanics that make extraction possible in practice must be designed, documented, and tested against the applicable legal framework before the investment is made, not when the investor is ready to exit.

4. Governance Must Be Built for Future Stress

Not Present Alignment

At the point of entry, relationships between co-investors are typically aligned. Commercial terms have been agreed, objectives are shared, and the instinct (particularly when one party is a state entity or politically connected partner) is to preserve goodwill by leaving governance arrangements loosely documented. This is one of the most expensive instincts in African deal-making.

The governance documentation is not tested during periods of commercial harmony. It is tested when interests diverge, when commodity prices fall, when a state partner’s political priorities shift, when a change of control is proposed, or when a foreign investor wants to exit. By that point, poorly documented governance is not an administrative inconvenience. It is a structural vulnerability that a counterparty with state backing, natural resource control, or regulatory influence will exploit.

IN PRACTICE: CMOC AND GÉCAMINES IN THE DRC

Gécamines is the Democratic Republic of Congo’s state-owned mining enterprise and a minority partner in several of the country’s most significant copper and cobalt operations. CMOC holds an 80% controlling interest in Tenke Fungurume, one of the world’s largest high-grade copper-cobalt deposits, with Gécamines holding the remaining 20%.  Over time, Gécamines has used that minority position and the legal leverage that comes with being a state entity holding underlying mineral rights to systematically renegotiate, assert approval rights over ownership changes, and demand increased economic participation. In the Kipushi project, Gécamines’ contractual stake is set to increase from 38% to 43% in 2027, and further to 80% once extraction milestones are reached, terms that fundamentally alter the long-term economics of the investment. In the Chemaf situation, Gécamines used a discretionary prior approval right embedded in a lease agreement to block a sale of assets it had licensed to a third party, asserting that the change of control required its consent even though Chemaf, not Gécamines, was the operating entity.  These are not irregular events. They are the predictable consequence of investing in a jurisdiction where state participation rights are not merely formal but actively deployed, where the political economy of natural resources creates ongoing pressure to renegotiate initial terms, and where governance documentation that appeared adequate at entry does not adequately constrain those pressures over time. The structure that looked workable when copper prices and political priorities were aligned looks entirely different a decade later when neither is.

Board composition, reserved matters, funding obligations, change of control provisions, transfer restrictions, exit mechanics, and dispute resolution are not technical extras to be finalised after the deal is done. They are the legal architecture that determines whether the business can continue to function and whether the investor can protect and realise its position when the relationship is under pressure. That architecture must be designed when interests are aligned, precisely because it will only matter when they are not.

5. Local Legal Expertise Is Essential

Not Optional

None of the four cases described above involved obscure or unusual legal requirements. MTN’s exchange control obligations were not hidden. Safaricom’s licence costs were knowable. Vodacom’s competition law exposure was analysable. The legal frameworks governing Gécamines’ participation rights existed in the applicable mining codes and joint venture agreements.

What each case required (what generic regional legal advice could not provide) was deep, jurisdiction-specific understanding of how those frameworks operate in practice: how regulators exercise discretion, how state entities deploy legal leverage, how exchange control approvals are processed, and how standard contractual protections perform under domestic legal and political conditions.

No legal team, however experienced at a regional level, can credibly know the detailed regulatory expectations of every African jurisdiction. Local legal expertise is not an operational convenience. It is a structural requirement of responsible market entry.

This does not mean that regional strategy is not possible. It means that regional strategy must be supported by jurisdiction-specific legal insight at each point of entry, structuring, and ongoing operation. It requires that local directors, senior in-country advisors, and local counsel are not a concession to administrative necessity, but a material risk-management tool.

Three Questions Every Investor Must Answer Before Entry

Before proceeding with an investment into any African market, three legal questions must be answered. Not in principle, but in documented, jurisdiction-specific, regulatory-tested detail:

  • Can we enter this market lawfully and what does lawful entry actually cost, in licensing fees, ownership concessions, and regulatory timeline?
  • Can we operate and control the business lawfully and does the regulatory framework for that operation constrain our governance, competitive behaviour, or capital structure in ways we have fully mapped?
  • Can we extract value and exit lawfully and have we designed and documented the specific legal mechanics, not merely satisfied ourselves that extraction is permissible in principle?
If the answer to any one of these questions is uncertain, the investment structure is not yet complete.

The legal complexity of African market entry is not a reason to avoid the continent. It is a reason to take the legal architecture of each investment as seriously as the commercial thesis. The cases described in this article involved sophisticated, well-resourced investors with deep African experience. Their losses and delays were not the result of ignorance. They were the result of underestimating the gap between legal principle and legal mechanics in specific jurisdictions.

That gap is precisely where local legal expertise operates. And it is precisely why Africa, as a legal matter, remains not one market, but fifty-four.

Shaun Jacobs

Director – Jacobs Potgieter Incorporated.

© Jacobs Potgieter Incorporated. This article is published for general information purposes and does not constitute legal advice. Specific legal advice should be obtained in relation to any particular matter.

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